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Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive econometric framework for the em-
pirical analysis of countervailing power. It encompasses the two main fea-
tures of pricing schemes in business-to-business relationships: nonlinear price
schedules and bargaining over rents. Disentangling them is critical to the em-
pirical identification of countervailing power. Testable predictions from the
theoretical analysis are delineated, and a pragmatic empirical methodology
is presented. It is readily implementable on the basis of transaction data,
routinely collected by antitrust authorities. The empirical framework is il-
lustrated using data from the UK brick industry. The paper emphasizes the
importance of controlling for endogeneity of volumes and for heterogeneity
across buyers and sellers.
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1 Introduction
Countervailing power, often referred to as buyer power, is a paramount con-
cern in competition analysis. It is a line of inquiry in many competition
investigations focussing on business-to-business (B2B) dealings. Quintessen-
tial high profile examples are the relationships between supermarkets and
their suppliers.1 Another recent topical example is the relationship between
Chinese steel mills and Australian and Brazilian iron ore miners.2
At the center of many competition inquiries are often generic products,
e.g. groceries or raw materials. Then, the focus is on per unit prices, usually
obtained by antitrust bodies as revenue per unit sold. This price measure
typically constitutes a combination of the respective portion of a nonlinear
unit price schedule and a lump sum payment, e.g. a franchise fee, rebate, ret-
rospective quantity discounts or other incentive payment that is the outcome
of bargaining over joint surplus between buyer and supplier. Hence, one of the
primary difficulties in the analysis of buyer power on the basis of unit prices
is the important distinction between nonlinear pricing and the appropriation
of rents by means of bargaining.3
The conceptual contribution of this paper is a framework that connects
1On the European level, the European Commission considered buyer power issues in the German
- Austrian merger Rewe/Meinl (1999) and the French - Spanish merger Carrefour/Promode`s (2000);
see also European Commission (1999). On the national level, see, for example, the recent market
inquiry into UK grocery retailing by the UK Competition Commission, in particular Provisional
Findings Appendix 8; the report can be downloaded from the Competition Commission website.
2See Financial Times UK online, 09 July 2008. In spite of shipping costs per tonne from Brazil
being twice those from Australia, Brazilian and Australian miners receive the same freight-on-
board price. This is interpreted as a reflection of superior negotiating power of Brazilian miners
when bargaining with Chinese mills, given the size of Chinese demand for, and the limitations on
Australian miners’ capacity in the supply of, iron ore.
3See also Bonnet et al. (2004) who investigate manufacturer-retailer relationships involving
nonlinear pricing. They present empirical tests of two-part tariffs with versus without retail price
maintenance embedded in a structural model of competition in differentiated product markets (e.g.
Berry (1994), Berry et al. (1995)) using market level data.
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the analysis of countervailing power4 with the design of optimal nonlinear
pricing schemes, while at the same time incorporating bargaining over rents.
It thereby illuminates how buyer power is enhanced by the buyer’s ability
to switch between suppliers, and is constrained by the suppliers’ outside op-
tions and capacity; in particular, in contrast to Chipty and Snyder (1999),
Smith and Thanassoulis (2008) and some conventional wisdom, this paper
shows that, in the face of suppliers’ capacity constraints, buyer size may di-
minish buyer power. The theoretical model also offers supplier heterogeneity,
arising from idiosyncratic outside options, as a new explanation of equilib-
rium price dispersion; this line of argument is particularly pertinent to the
business-to-business context where traditional explanations in terms of im-
perfect information are implausible.5
The methodological contribution of the paper is a robust and practical
econometric methodology to identify countervailing power on the basis of B2B
transaction panel data. Such data are typically available in antitrust inquiries.
The proposed econometric approach is grounded in the theoretical framework
of B2B bargaining, highlights the importance of proper treatment of hetero-
geneity across bargains, and does not rely on complex identifying assumptions
or restrictions that are difficult to test. Instead, the econometric methodology
examines testable implications of the theory and thereby offers a robust route
to the empirical identification of countervailing power. Furthermore, it is easy
to implement and hence does not suffer from the typical barriers to diffusion
into applied competition analysis that many other methodologies are fraught
with. It is illustrated using data from a UK Competition Commission merger
inquiry in the brick manufacturing industry.
The paper proceeds as follows. After a brief review of the relevant antitrust
background, section 2 outlines the theoretical model that guides the analysis;
the section concludes with the main issues that an econometric analysis of
countervailing power has to confront and delineates implications for a robust
empirical strategy to identify countervailing power. Section 3 is devoted to
the empirical part of the paper. It presents the background for, and data used
4The notion of countervailing (buyer) power was coined by Galbraith (1952) and theoretically
developed in a dynamic setting by Snyder (1996).
5The traditional view relates to retail prices and is articulated in Salop and Stiglitz (1977, 1982),
Reinganum (1979), Burdett and Judd (1983), Carlson and McAfee (1983), Hallagan and Joerding
(1985), Sorensen (2000) and the ensuing literature on equilibrium price dispersion.
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in, the applied part of the paper, and it summarizes the empirical analysis.
Section 4 concludes.
1.1 Countervailing Power Analysis in Antitrust
The analysis of buyer power is often an integral part in antitrust inquiries. The
UK Competition Merger Guidelines (2003)6 consider buyer power in merger
assessment: Do buyers, either because of their size or commercial signifi-
cance to their suppliers, have the ability to prevent the exercise of market
power by suppliers? This ability, if present, is akin to Galbraith’ (1952) no-
tion of countervailing buyer power. The Competition Commission considers
such countervailing power as one potential mitigating factor, next to others
such as entry and switching costs, in the assessment of upstream mergers. In
the competition assessment in its market investigations (Competition Com-
mission Market Investigation Guidelines (2003)), it investigates the relative
importance to each other of each firm’s business with the counterparty; there
is an additional question whether any price reductions, obtained by virtue of
buyer power, are passed on to consumers. The guidelines enumerate several
factors that are viewed as potentially affecting buyers’ ability to constrain
suppliers: buyers’ ability to find alternative suppliers; the ease with which
buyers can switch suppliers; the extent to which buyers can credibly threaten
to set up their own supply arrangements, e.g. by backward integration or by
sponsoring entry; the extent to which buyers can impose costs on suppliers,
e.g. by delaying or stopping purchases or by transferring risk. It is worth
noting in this regard that a buyer’s size can cut both ways: while size en-
hances the significance of the buyer’s business vis-a`-vis the supplier, it makes
switching more difficult when alternative suppliers’ capacities are constrained.
A prototypical buyer power analysis is the Competition Commission’s in-
vestigation as part of its inquiry into grocery retailing in the UK (2008). Based
on their size, pricing and margins, the Commission concluded that all large
retailers, wholesalers and buying groups have buyer power vis-a`-vis their sup-
pliers. However, the Commission considered that their buyer power is offset
by market power of suppliers of branded goods; and that lower prices aris-
ing from buyer power in part are passed on to consumers. The Commission
6At the time of writing, the Competition Commission is drafting a revision of its guidelines.
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substantiated these findings with an analysis of panel data, which for vari-
ous stock-keeping-units (SKUs) comprised yearly prices, volumes and some
cost information. The Commission’s methodology consisted of fixed-effects
regressions of unit prices on volumes.
The Commission’s analysis raises several questions. Panel data meth-
ods can capture unobserved heterogeneity. The analysis modelled SKU-level
idiosyncratic effects, but is this the appropriate level of heterogeneity? More-
over, does aggregation to annual data mask latent heterogeneity across time?
The analysis may also raise concerns about the treatment of volumes: If
business-to-business relationships involve bargaining over both volumes and
prices, then volumes should be treated as endogenous regressors. Furthermore,
the caveat about the ambiguous volume effect notwithstanding, the Commis-
sion’s analysis focussed on volume effects on prices as evidence of buyer power,
without attempting to quantify buyer’s ability to switch suppliers. But vol-
ume effects on unit prices might just reflect suppliers’ nonlinear pricing and
self-selection of buyers into the appropriate part of the tariff, irrespective of
buyer power. Hence, this type of reduced form analysis might be critiqued
along various dimensions, and it highlights that the treatment of potential
heterogeneity across buyers and suppliers, endogeneity of prices and volumes
and the distinction between nonlinear pricing and bargaining over rents are
the primary empirical challenges of the empirical analysis of buyer power.
1.2 Related Literature
Its growing importance and policy relevance notwithstanding, the academic
literature on buyer power is still relatively sparse. Inderst and Mazzarotto
(2006) survey its main theoretical strands to date, as they relate to sources
and consequences of, as well as policy responses to, buyer power of retailers
vis-a`-vis manufacturers. With regard to applied work, the academic literature
offers very little towards a comprehensive, structural empirical framework for
the analysis of buyer power.7 Giulietti (2007) presents a reduced form anal-
7There is some early nonstructural work that provides empirical evidence supporting counter-
vailing buyer power; see Adelman (1959), Brooks (1973), Buzzell et al. (1975), Lustgarten (1975),
McGukin and Chen (1976), McKie (1950), Clevenger and Campbell (1977), Boulding and Staelin
(1990). Dobson and Waterson (1997) and von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) examine the effect on
countervailing power on consumer prices.
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ysis of the Italian grocery retail sector, approximating suppliers’ bargaining
power by a concentration measure for the respective product level industry
they operate in. Chipty and Snyder’s (1999) approach exhibits more detailed
structural features. It provides an empirically testable condition - concavity
of the supplier’s revenue function - that needs to be satisfied for larger buyers,
e.g. arising from buyer mergers, to obtain lower transfer prices when bargain-
ing over surplus with their suppliers. This framework captures the anecdotal
view that larger buyers enjoy greater buyer power. It is useful when the analy-
sis focuses on revenues for bespoke goods or services; this is the case in Chipty
and Synder’s application of their model to the US cable television industry.
While Chipty and Snyder consider the case of an upstream monopoly, El-
lison and Snyder (2001) build on this approach and investigate the role of
substitution possibilities as a consequence of upstream competition. They fo-
cus on price differences in wholesale pharmaceutical markets between different
types of buyers, controlling for various institutional differences with regard to
drug administration.8 Recent work by Smith and Thanassoulis (2008) demon-
strates how upstream competition can endow large buyers with market power
by inducing supplier-level volume uncertainty.
Related work by Villas-Boas (2007) examines vertical relationships be-
tween manufacturers and retailers with limited data, when wholesale prices
for transactions between them are not observed; her objective is to indirectly
identify the strategic model appropriate for their interaction from demand
and cost estimates, with a particular focus on pricing models which feature
double marginalization.
8Drugs can be branded and subject to patent protection, branded and subject to generic com-
petitors, or generic and subject to some form of oligopolistic competition. Buyers such as HMOs
and hospitals have wider substitution possibilities through the use of restrictive formularies relative
to chain drugstores and independent drugstores. Ellison and Snyder (2001) empirically examine
the effects of different features of drugs on the difference in prices paid by various types of buyers.
Using cross-section data, their analysis cannot model unobserved heterogeneity across buyers. The
empirical analysis presented in this paper demonstrates that there exist circumstances in which
the conclusion about buyer power critically hinges on accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.
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2 Theory
As a preamble to the theoretical section of the paper, it is worth emphasizing
at the outset that the theoretical framework outlined below is a stylized char-
acterization of business-to-business bargaining and not intended to capture
all the intricacies of business-to-business relationships. Instead, it is intended
to motivate the main issues that econometric analyses of buyer power have to
deal with. The empirical strategy proposed in this paper deliberately follows a
reduced form econometric approach that is informed by the structural model,
but does not suffer from the typical potential criticism of strong identifying
restrictions that structural approaches rely upon. The econometric approach
proposed here instead relies on testable implications that are robust across
more tightly specified structural models.
2.1 Multilateral Bargaining
To start, consider bilateral bargaining with complete information between a
single buyer and suppliers of an input to the buyer’s production technology.
Consider the following assumptions:
A1: The buyer’s production technology uses input q with revenue function
F (q) = qθ, θ ∈ (0, 1).
A2: The buyer faces a supplier whose payment schedule for the delivery of
q is given by C(q) = βqα, α, β ≥ 0. The supplier incurs zero cost of
production.
A3: The buyer maximizes profits F (q)−C(q); Nash bargaining over the joint
surplus between buyer and supplier induces the optimal price schedule
that the supplier presents to the buyer.
Proposition 1: Under assumptions A1-A3, the optimal nonlinear price
schedule is p¯(q) = q2θ−1.
Proof: Bargaining over surplus is the first stage of a two-stage game be-
tween the buyer and the supplier. On the second stage, given a price schedule
p(q) and associated payment schedule C(q) = p(q)q, the buyer chooses the
profit maximizing amount of inputs. This two-stage game is solved by back-
wards induction.
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Maximizing the buyer’s profits pi(q;α, β) = F (q)−C(q) = qθ − βqα over q
on the second stage yields optimal inputs q¯ =
(
θ
αβ
) 1
α−θ . The associated max-
imum profit is q¯θ−βq¯α =
(
θ
αβ
) θ
α−θ −β
(
θ
αβ
) α
α−θ =
(
1
β
) θ
α−θ ( θ
α
) α
α−θ
(
α
θ − 1
)
>
0, provided α > θ.
Following Stole and Zwiebel (1996), Nash bargaining on the first stage
induces the supplier to design the payment schedule such that the loss from
a breakdown in negotiations for both parties equate, i.e. the supplier chooses
α¯ > θ and β¯ > 0 that
pi(q¯; α¯, β¯) =
(
θ
α¯β¯
) θ
α¯−θ
− β¯
(
θ
α¯β¯
) α¯
α¯−θ
= β¯
(
θ
α¯β¯
) α¯
α¯−θ
.
This implies that α¯ = 2θ, while β¯ is indeterminate, so without loss of genere-
ality β¯ = 1. This implies the optimal price schedule p¯(q) = C¯(q)/q = β¯qα¯/q =
q2θ−1, and the buyer’s and supplier’s profits are
(
θ
α¯
) α¯
α¯−θ = 14 . ¤.
Suppose now that the buyer faces two identical suppliers, i.e. there is
upstream competition and the buyer bargains multilaterally. The buyer will
find it optimal to source from both if the optimal payment schedule is convex,
i.e. α > 1. Therefore, consider the assumptions
A1’: The buyer’s production technology uses input q and induces the revenue
function F (q) = qθ, θ ∈ (12 , 1).
A2’: The buyer faces two identical suppliers whose payment schedule for the
delivery of q is given by C(q) = βqα, β ≥ 0, α > 1. The suppliers incur
zero cost of production.
A3’: The buyer maximizes profits; Nash bargaining over the joint surplus
between buyer and suppliers holding passive beliefs9 induces the optimal
price schedule that the supplier presents to the buyer.
Proposition 2: Under assumptions A1’, A2’ and A3’, upstream competi-
tion induces an optimal nonlinear price schedule p˜(q) that involves p˜(q) < p¯(q)
for all q > 0, where p¯(q) is given by Proposition 1.
9Cf. McAfee and Schwartz (1994); this assumption is maintained in Stole and Zwiebel and,
more generally, the literature on bargaining with multiple agents. It stipulates in this context
that in any bilateral bargaining situation between a buyer and a supplier, the parties hold the
belief that, should bargaining between them break down, the buyer reaches an efficient bargaining
outcome with the other supplier.
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Proof: Since the marginal contribution to the buyer’s revenue from either
supplier is the same at an optimal input allocation, it must be that, with
convex payments, the buyer sources the same amount from both. Hence, on
the second stage, the supplier maximizes (2q)θ − 2βqα over q. This yields
optimal inputs q˜ = 2
θ−1
α−θ
(
θ
αβ
) 1
α−θ = 2
θ−1
α−θ q¯ < q¯ and 2q˜ = 2
α−1
α−θ q¯ > q¯. This
implies associated maximum profits of pi(q˜;α, β) = 2
θ(α−1)
α−θ pi(q¯;α, β).
Consider the Nash bargaining stage where the buyer faces a supplier, hold-
ing passive beliefs. The supplier designs a price schedule with parameters α˜
and β˜ such as to equate the loss to the buyer from breakdown with the sup-
plier’s loss of revenue, i.e.
2
θ(α−1)
α−θ pi(q¯; α˜, β˜)− 1
4
= β˜
(
θ
α˜β˜
) α˜
α˜−θ
2
(˜αθ−1)
α˜−θ .
Suppose the supplier were to choose α˜ = 2θ and β˜ = 1, as in Proposition 1,
i.e. as if there were no upstream competition. Then, the buyer’s lost profits
(the LHS of the preceding equality) would be 14
(
22θ−1 − 1) > 0 if θ > 12 ,
while the supplier’s lost profits (the RHS of the preceding equality) would be
1
42
2θ−1. Hence, the supplier has more to lose from a breakdown in bargaining
than the buyer and, therefore, has an incentive to offer better terms10, i.e.
α˜ < α¯ and β˜ ≤ β¯. ¤
Proposition 2 shows that upstream competition endows the buyer with
countervailing power vis-a`-vis suppliers that permits to extract uniformly
more favorable terms from them. It follows as a corollary that the buyer’s
profits are increased by upstream competition. This inspires the definition of
countervailing buyer power in terms of equilibrium prices:
Definition: Consider a buyer who faces a nonlinear equilibrium price
schedule p¯i(q), q > 0, in the presence of an upstream monopoly of supplier
i. The buyer enjoys countervailing power if, in equilibrium, the supplier i
present the buyer with a nonlinear price schedule p˜i(q) < p¯i(q) for all q > 0.
Considering the equilibrium pay-off structure resulting from Proposition
2, by construction the pay-offs are balanced and efficient. Moreover, they
are individually fair, i.e. they exceed the individual non-cooperation pay offs;
10This can also be formally shown by noting that the derivative of the buyer’s loss with respect
to α and β at α¯ and β¯ is negative and dominated by the derivative of the supplier’s loss with
respect to the payment parameters at that point, so that the values α˜ and β˜ cannot be larger than
α¯ and β¯.
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symmetric, i.e. the equivalent suppliers receive the same pay-offs; additive
across bargains; and satisfy that a supplier who does not contribute to the joint
surplus receives a zero pay-off. The revenue or profit accruing to the supplier
therefore has the interpretation of the supplier’s Shapley value associated
with the cooperative game between the buyer and the two suppliers.11 Since
q˜ < q¯, it follows that p˜(q˜)q˜ < p¯(q¯)q¯. This inspires an equivalent definition of
countervailing buyer power in terms of Shapley values:
Definition: Consider supplier i’s Shapley value in the cooperative game
associated with the coalition including only i and the buyer, p¯i(q¯i)q¯i. The
buyer enjoys countervailing power if i’s Shapley value in the cooperative game
associated with the coalition including, inter alia, supplier i and the buyer,
p˜i(q˜i)q˜i, satisfies p˜i(q˜i)q˜i < p¯i(q¯i)q¯i.
It also follows as a corollary to the two preceding propositions that any
outside options the suppliers have, such as the selling to other buyers, enhances
their bargaining outcome, because such outside options reduce the loss they
incur in the event of a breakdown of bargaining.
A question that arises in the presence of upstream competition is whether
Bertrand style price competition would not drive prices below those predicted
by Proposition 2. While it is beyond the scope of this analysis to address
this concern in a more comprehensive framework, results due to Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) suggest that, in industries where capacity is a strategic
variable, price competition subsequent to capacity choices yields Cournot com-
petition outcomes, with prices above marginal cost. In the kind of applications
that are envisaged for this theoretical investigation, capacity typically plays
an essential role, not least because it may well limit the extent to which the
buyer may be able to credibly threaten to divert demand away from a supplier.
To generalize this setup further, consider the case where the two suppli-
ers are heterogeneous, e.g. due to different outside options12. Consider the
following variant of the previous assumptions,
A2”: The buyer faces two heterogeneous suppliers whose payment schedules
11See Myerson (1980), Hart and Mas Colell (1989), Stole and Zwiebel (1996).
12For example, this could be thought of as the buyer under consideration being located at the
midpoint of a Hotelling street connecting the two suppliers, and a second buyer being located on
the opposite side of the first supplier, say. The distance between supplier 1 and the second buyer
is then shorter than between the second buyer and supplier 2.
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for the delivery of q are given by C(q) = βqα, β > 1, α > 2θ, and
supplier i’s outside option is given by (β − βδi)qα, i = {1, 2}, where
0 < δ1 < δ2 < 1.
A3”: The buyer maximizes profits; Nash bargaining over the joint surplus
between buyer and suppliers holding passive beliefs induces the optimal
price schedule that the supplier presents to the buyer, where suppliers
optimize β, taken α as given13
In this setup, supplier 1 has a more favorable outside option.
Proposition 3: Under assumption A1’, A2” and A3”, in an interior
equilibrium in which the buyer sources from both suppliers, assuming it exists,
the optimal nonlinear price schedule of supplier 1, p¯1(q), dominates the one
for supplier 2, p¯2(q), in the sense that p¯1(q) > p¯2(q) for all q > 0.
Remark: Lemma 1 in the Appendix establishes conditions under which a
dual-sourcing equilibrium exists.
Proof : At the second stage, the buyer maximizes (q1+q2)θ−β1qα1 −β2qα2 .
At the optimal input allocation (q¯1, q¯2), the marginal contribution of the two
suppliers to the buyer’s revenue must be the same, so that q¯2 = γq¯1, where
γ =
(
β2
β1
) 1
1−α . Hence, the buyer maximizes (q1(1 + γ))
θ − β1qα1 − β2(γq1)α,
which yields
q¯1 =
(1 + γ)
θ
α−θ
(β1 + γαβ2)
1
α−θ
(
θ
α
) 1
α−θ
,
and the buyer’s profit is
pi(q¯1;β1, β2) =
(1 + γ)
θα
α−θ
(β1 + γαβ2)
θ
α−θ
[(
θ
α
) θ
α−θ
−
(
θ
α
) α
α−θ
]
.
=
(1 + γ)
θα
α−θ
(β1 + γαβ2)
θ
α−θ
(
θ
α
) α
α−θ (α
θ
− 1
)
.
Consider the Nash bargaining stage between the buyer and supplier 1,
assuming passive beliefs. If bargaining breaks down, then the buyer’s profit
reached with supplier 2 is pi(q¯;α, β) =
(
θ
αβ
) θ
α−θ − β
(
θ
αβ
) α
α−θ , as in Propo-
13While this restricts the elasticity of the equilibrium payment schedules to be the same for
the heterogeneous suppliers, it allows for different levels in the schedules. This restriction is for
analytical convenience.
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sition 1. Supplier 2’s profit, beyond 2’s outside option, is βδ2
(
θ
αβ
) α
α−θ .14
Hence, supplier 2 will design a price schedule such as to equate this excess
profit with pi(q¯;α, β), choosing β2 =
(
α
θ − 1
) 1
1−δ2 > 1, i.e. ceteris paribus
the higher supplier 2’s outside option (the lower δ2), the less favorable the
terms offered to the buyer. The profit of the buyer under these terms is
pi(q¯;β2) =
(
θ
α
) α
α−θ
(
α
θ − 1
) θ
(1−δ2)(α−θ) . Hence, when bargaining with the buyer,
supplier 1 will equate the loss to the buyer in the event of a breakdown,
∆pi2(β1, β2, δ2) =
[
(1 + γ)
θα
α−θ
(β1 + γαβ2)
θ
α−θ
(α
θ
− 1
)
−
(α
θ
− 1
) θ
(1−δ2)(α−θ)
](
θ
α
) α
α−θ
(1)
with supplier 1’s loss of revenue beyond the outside option,
s1(β1, β2, δ1) = βδ11
(1 + γ)
θα
α−θ
(β1 + γαβ2)
θ
α−θ
(
θ
α
) α
α−θ
.
This implicitly defines supplier 1’s optimal design response to supplier 2,
b1(β2; δ1, δ2), as the solution of
∆pi2(b1(β2; δ1, δ2), β2, δ2) = s1(b1(β2; δ1, δ2), β2, δ1).
Analogous considerations with regard to Nash bargaining between the buyer
and supplier 2 yield supplier 2’s optimal design response to supplier 1, b2(β1; δ1, δ2).
Suppose it were the case that β? = b1(β?; δ1, δ2) = b2(β?; δ1, δ2), so that
γ = 1, while δ1 < δ2. Then,
∆pi1(β?; δ1, δ2) =
[(
2α
2β?
) θ
α−θ (α
θ
− 1
)
−
(α
θ
− 1
) θ
(1−δ2)(α−θ)
](
θ
α
) α
α−θ
∆pi2(β?; δ1, δ2) =
[(
2α
2β?
) θ
α−θ (α
θ
− 1
)
−
(α
θ
− 1
) θ
(1−δ1)(α−θ)
](
θ
α
) θ
α−θ
s1(β?; δ1, δ2) = (β?)
δ1
(
θ
α
) α
α−θ
(
2α
2β
) α
α−θ
s2(β?; δ1, δ2) = (β?)
δ2
(
θ
α
) α
α−θ
(
2α
2β
) α
α−θ
and δ1 < δ2 then implies that
∆pi1(β?; δ1, δ2) > ∆pi2(β?; δ1, δ2)
s1(β?; δ1, δ2) > s2(β?; δ1, δ2),
14This requires the implicit assumption that, once negotiations between the buyer and supplier
1 have broken down, the buyer will not re-start negotiations with supplier 1, so that supplier 2
effectively enjoys a monopoly position.
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This implies that, under equal terms β?, the buyer loses more when negotia-
tions with supplier 1 break down than when they break down with supplier
2, even though supplier 1 enjoys the more favorable outside option. This in
turn, implies that, in equilibrium, supplier 1 chooses uniformly less favorable
terms relative to those implied by β?, while supplier 2 ameliorates the terms
offered to the buyer relative to β?, so that p¯1(q) = β?1q
α > β?2q
α for all q > 0,
where
β?1 = b1 (b2(β
?
1 ; δ1, δ2); δ1, δ2)
β?2 = b2(β
?
1 ; δ1, δ2) < β
?
1 .
Note that, in equilibrium, it must be that β?2 > 1, since otherwise supplier
2’s outside option would be negative, implying a gain to the supplier from
breakdown of negotiations with the buyer. ¤
Proposition 3 has the noteworthy corollary that supplier 2 may well ben-
efit from a very favorable outside option on the part of supplier 1, which
makes it easy for supplier 1 to walk away from negotiations with the buyer,
approximating the situation of a single supplier, as in Proposition 1. Since
β?1 > β
?
2 and A1’ and A2” imply α > 1, it follows that q¯
?
2 = γ
?q¯?1, where
γ? =
(
β?2
β?1
) 1
α−1
> 1 so that q¯?2 > q¯
?
1, for q¯
?
1 =
(1+γ?)
θ
α−θ
(β?1+γ
?αβ?2 )
1
α−θ
(
θ
α
) 1
α−θ . There-
fore, the higher supplier 1’s outside option, the more aggressively he can afford
to price in equilibrium and, consequently, the more supplier 2 can sell and the
higher supplier 2’s revenues. Suppliers’ capacity constraints can naturally be
cast in this framework. A supplier operating at close to capacity does not
suffer much from a breakdown in negotiations with the buyer. With complete
information, this allows a competing supplier to price aggressively, essentially
earning the shadow value of the rival’s capacity constraint. The aforemen-
tioned example of equal freight-on-board iron ore prices paid by Chinese still
mills to Australian and Brazilian miners illustrates this case.
Furthermore, the proposition shows that supplier heterogeneity can induce
dispersion of nonlinear equilibrium prices. This is different from the expla-
nation of (retail) price dispersion as a consequence of incomplete information
and search costs, and it is a plausible alternative explanation especially in
the business-to-business bargaining context where search costs are typically
small, at least relative to the size and value of the transaction.
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The ensemble of Propositions 1 - 3 implies another remarkable corollary.
It shows that, if the buyer and a supplier operate in geographically dispersed
markets and meet in several different local markets which exhibit different
levels of upstream competition, then this induces dispersion of nonlinear equi-
librium prices across their transactions, in the sense that the same buyer pays
different prices for the same quantity in different local markets. This is illus-
trated in the empirical section of the paper.
2.2 Implications for Empirical Strategy
Consider a generic equilibrium price schedule in B2B bargaining between sup-
plier i and buyer j of the form pij(qij ;µi, µj), where µi and µj parameterize
the supplier’s and buyer’s outside options. In particular, µj is a function of
buyer j’s access to alternative suppliers to supplier i. The preceding theoret-
ical results suggest the following properties of equilibrium price schedules in
B2B bargaining:
• Transaction volume qij is an endogenous right-hand-side variable.
• In the presence of upstream market power, equilibrium prices are non-
linear.
• In the presence of multi-sourcing, pij(q;µi, µj) is non-decreasing in q.
• Upstream market power operates through δi, in the sense that enhanced
outside options on the part of supplier i induce uniformly higher equi-
librium prices pij(q;µi, µj) for all q.
• Countervailing buyer power operates through µj , in the sense that greater
switching possibilities to alternative suppliers reduce the equilibrium
price schedule pij(q;µi, µj) uniformly for all q.
• To the extent that µi and µj are private information, they constitute
unobserved heterogeneity across buyers and suppliers.
These considerations suggest an econometric model for equilibrium prices
in B2B bargaining of the form
pijt = α+ µi + µj + βqijt + x′ijtθ + ²ijt,
where t indexes transactions between i and j, xijt is a vector of characteristics
of the respective transaction (other than volume and price), ²ijt is a residual
14
term, (α, β′, θ′) is a vector of parameters, and µi and µj are idiosyncratic
supplier and buyer effects, respectively. This model can be estimated using
transaction panel data, provided instruments for the endogenous regressor
qijt are available. Instruments that naturally suggest themselves are data on
transaction logistics such as delivery or transport arrangements, under the
identifying assumption that there is no bundling, or volumes of transactions
between i and j in non-overlapping geographic markets.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Background and Data15
The data for the empirical part of this paper come from the UK brick in-
dustry. This sector has been the focus of a recent merger inquiry by the UK
competition authorities where the question of potential countervailing buyer
power was also investigated, as bricks are a relatively standardized product
and there are several manufacturers in the UK. There are four main suppli-
ers of bricks in the UK, and the data comprise their transactions with all
their UK customers in the period 2001 - 2006. Customers are construction
firms, or builders, and intermediaries, such as builders’ merchants and factors
(merchants specializing on bricks).
Each of the four brick manufacturers is involved in all stages of the brick
manufacturing process. This process starts from extracting clay from the soil
and processing it, including shaping it, and eventually burning the bricks in
large furnaces or kilns. As transportation costs are significant in this indus-
try, most manufacturing plants are close to clay deposits, and buyers favor
nearby manufacturing plants. Two main types of bricks emerge from these
processes: facing bricks, used as cladding material for the outside of buildings,
distinguishing the more expensive soft-mud brick from the more conventional
extruded variety; and engineering bricks, used to erect structures and accord-
ingly meeting special requirements with regard to load-bearing capacity and
water retention.
15The description of the industry background follows the UK Competition Commissions provi-
sional findings report onWienerberger Finance Service BV / Baggeridge Brick plc (2007), Appendix
C. The report is available from the Competition Commission website.
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The industry has been experiencing some decline over the last decades.
Industry sources attribute this to reductions in the number of houses built,
the change in the housing mix from detached and semi-detached houses to
apartments, and different choices for structural and cladding materials, such
as timber, concrete blocks, steel and curtain walling (glass, laminates etc.).
With regard to the procurement of bricks, there are two primary channels.
One possibility is for buyers to purchase through framework agreements at
pre-determined prices. These agreements set out a matrix of prices and brick
specifications, including brick type and transport costs to different locations.
Prices can be quoted as ex-works or delivered prices. Buyers can thereby
negotiate the terms of the agreement, including retrospective rebates, poten-
tially on the basis of historic and prospective volumes. Eventually, once a
framework is agreed upon, there is, however, no firm commitment on the part
of the buyer, who can call off supplies according to the needs as they arise.
Builders’ merchants also use framework agreements, albeit typically with less
detailed specificity. Framework agreements are typically negotiated annually.
Alternatively, bricks can be purchased ad hoc at spot prices. Buyers may
still enjoy eventual retrospective rebates, and many buyers who sign frame-
work agreements may still buy ad hoc, e.g. when a manufacturer wishes to
sell off stock or a buyer experiences an unusual demand in terms of brick type,
location or volume. While the main manufacturers do have price lists, these
list prices do not apply to the bulk of bricks transactions.
The analysis presented here focuses on ex works prices per one thousand
bricks, i.e. net of transport costs, and also net of any rebates. Since the data
from one of the suppliers do not permit us to separate transport costs from
total transaction price, this supplier’s data have been excluded from most of
the analysis.
There are just below 7000 customers that purchased bricks from the four
suppliers over the six year period 2001 - 2006. Table 2 shows that there is a fair
amount of switching of these between the four suppliers. But often, suppliers
are able to make up the loss of customers by selling increased volume to those
customers who are retained, e.g. supplier 3 in the periods 2001 - 2002; or even
compensating for loss of volume by raising prices on the retained volume, e.g.
supplier 1 in the period 2005 - 2006. Hence, while Table 2 suggests that
buyers’ switching to and from suppliers is a salient feature of the UK brick
16
industry and hence provides the kind of conditions that potentially incubate
buyer power, it also provides some evidence that manufacturers’ may have
market power when setting prices.
Supplier 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
Customers
Supplier 1 -0.061 0.017 0.015 -0.061 -0.045
Supplier 2 -0.119 0.099 -0.109 0.060 -0.100
Supplier 3 -0.208 0.0217 0.075 0.086 0.005
Volume
Supplier 1 0.046 0.046 -0.017 0.004 -0.029
Supplier 2 -0.197 0.363 -0.056 0.136 -0.0777
Supplier 3 0.001 0.030 0.010 -0.003 -0.079
Revenue
Supplier 1 0.084 0.113 0.044 0.006 0.0695
Supplier 2 -0.179 0.416 -0.011 0.181 -0.030
Supplier 3 0.030 0.088 0.039 0.050 -0.002
Table 2: Switching, relative to base year.
The data also provide an interesting illustration of price dispersion in the
absence of imperfect information. Figure 1 shows the price per 1000 bricks
paid by three national builders for a red multi brick16 for all deliveries to
their various construction sites in 2004. This brick is manufactured by one
of the four brick manufacturers, and each of this manufacturer’s competitors
produces an essentially equivalent brick. It is straightforward for buyers to
enquire about the costs of such substitutes for this red multi brick, so imper-
fect information does not rationalize the price dispersion in the data. The
theoretical results above suggest that different local competitive conditions
around the delivery sites are consistent with this pattern of prices. The con-
struction sites are in areas with locally distinct numbers of competitors, and
these may have different outside options, possibly as a consequence of their
capacity utilizations.
A brief description, definitions and summary statistics of the variables
used in the analysis are provided in an appendix.
16Here, “red” refers to the bricks color, and “multi” to its non-uniform color shading.
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3.2 Methodology and Results
The empirical methodology aims at uncovering the reduced form relationship
between brick price and various determinants of price. The specific focus
thereby is on the question whether buyers who have established a greater
number of contractual relationships in the period 2001-2006 - as an indication
of their switching possibilities - benefit from lower prices, on average. The
empirical analysis attempts to control for various characteristics of the trans-
action. First, there may be volume effects when price schedules are potentially
nonlinear. Second, as in this industry transport costs are significant, relative
to brick price, there may be distance effects: Buyers with construction or de-
livery sites that are more distant to the manufacturer’s plants may be given
discounts to capture their business. Third, the analysis controls for brick at-
tributes: On average, extruded bricks are cheaper than soft-mud bricks, and
similarly engineering bricks are cheaper than facing bricks.
In light of the foregoing theoretical analysis, transaction volume may be
endogenous. The analysis therefore, next to ordinary regressions, presents
results obtained from instrumenting volume. The decision to have the bricks
delivered is likely to be correlated with the transaction size, but, in the absence
of bundling, uncorrelated with the transaction price which is net of delivery
costs. Therefore, a variable indicating whether the transaction volume was
arranged to be delivered, as opposed to being picked up, is used as instrument
for volume, next to time trends captured by month and year. First stage
regressions are also in the appendix.
Moreover, as is now increasingly recognized in applied demand analysis,
heterogeneity across economic decision makers is an empirical regularity that
should be accounted for, if possible. Panel data permit to control for buyer
specific effects if they are present. Hence, the empirical analysis in addition
presents panel data estimators that exploit the entire richness of the data.
Table 3 presents the estimation results from different estimation method-
ologies.17 Two main conclusions emerge when comparing the columns of the
table. First, comparing standard with instrumental variables regressions, fail-
ure to instrument transaction volume induces a downward bias, in absolute
value, of the distance and multi-sourcing effects. The source of the bias is
17The various acronyms are: OLS - ordinary least squares; IV/2SLS - instrumental variables/2-
stage least squares; RE - random effects panel data estimator; BE - between effects estimator.
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likely to be that the size of the buyer business determines both prices and
volumes. Large transactions are generated by larger businesses that enter-
tain a larger number of supplier relationships, and these tend to get lower
prices. Also, large transactions entail higher transport costs, and in order to
secure such deals suppliers grant more significant discounts. Second, compar-
ing standard with panel data estimators, failure to account for heterogeneity
across buyers biases the empirical results of this analysis towards a finding
of buyer power, albeit only at the 10 percent level of statistical significance.
Controlling also for supplier specific effects eliminates any buyer power effect
reflected in negative coefficients on the sourcing variable and captures the
distance effects that were present in the first five specifications.18 Supplier
effects arise due to the different capacities and plant network configurations
of the three suppliers included in the analysis: Supplier 3 is by far the largest
supplier, with the largest number of plants and the widest geographic spread
of its plants.19 Hence, from a methodological point of view, accounting for
both endogeneity of transaction volume and heterogeneity of buyers appears
to be critical for the empirical identification of buyer power. Also, unit prices
increasing in volume are in line with the theory of multilateral bargaining
laid out in Section 2, and it is consistent with upstream market power in
this industry. Together with the finding that multi-sourcing does not induce
lower unit prices, this calls into question the Competition Commission’s con-
clusion that “larger buyers do have a degree of buyer power, [...] based on the
purchasing of large volumes [...] and their ability to multi-source”.20
4 Conclusions
This paper provides a comprehensive framework for the empirical analysis of
buyer power that is useful for practitioners, such as competition economists in
antitrust authorities. This framework encompasses the two main features of
pricing schemes in business-to-business relationships: nonlinear price sched-
18In light of the suppliers’ plant network configurations, the distance variable is highly correlated
with the suppliers’ capacities, measured by the number of plants they operate.
19Appendix B provides further details on capacity. See also the Provisional Findings report
of the Competition Commission in the Wienerberger Finance Service BV / Baggeridge Brick plc
(2007) inquiry.
20See Competition Commission, final report on the Wienerberger / Baggeridge inquiry (2007).
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ules and bargaining over rents. Disentangling these two features is critical to
the empirical identification of buyer power. A structural theoretical model
investigates the principal determinants of optimal pricing schemes, with buy-
ers’ switching possibilities identified as the primary source of buyer power.
It forms the basis for the delineation of testable predictions that enable the
empirical identification of buyer power. The empirical part of the analysis
presents an illustration of the conceptual approach offered in this paper, for
the UK brick industry. It presents a reduced form methodology to estimate
the impact of buyers’ switching possibilities on prices. This methodology is
readily implementable on the basis of transaction data, as they are requested
routinely by antitrust authorities at the outset of their inquiries. The pa-
per emphasizes the importance to control for endogeneity of volumes and for
heterogeneity across buyers.
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A Existence of Dual-Sourcing Equilibria
Consider equation (1). A dual-sourcing equilibrium requires that, for the op-
timal values of β1 and β2, ∆pi1 and ∆pi2 be positive. The more elastic the
suppliers’ price schedules are relative to the buyer’s revenue function, i.e. the
higher αθ , the more profitable dual-sourcing will be
21. Similarly, the more fa-
vorable the suppliers’ outside options, i.e. the smaller max{δ1, δ2}, the more
the buyer benefits from dual-sourcing. The following result establishes that,
under adverse circumstances for the buyer, facing suppliers with sufficiently
favorable outside options, there exist ratios αθ that induce dual-sourcing equi-
libria.
Consider the following additional Assumption:
A4: max{δ1, δ2} < δ¯ := exp(1)−1exp(1) .
Lemma 1: Under assumptions A1’, A2”,A3” and A4, a dual-sourcing
equilibrium exist.
Proof: It follows from equation (1) that the profit from dual-sourcing is
rising in αθ , while the profit from single-sourcing is falling as
α
θ increases,
with the minimum occurring at αθ = 1 + exp(1). The value of δ that equates
θ
(1−δ)(α−θ) =
1
(1−δ)(α/θ−1) at
α
θ = 1 + exp(1) with 1 is δ¯ =
exp(1)−1
exp(1) . So
min{∆pi1,∆pi2} > 0 provided max{δ1, δ2} < δ¯ and (1+γ)
θα
α−θ
(β1+γαβ2)
θ
α−θ
≥ 1.
Suppose β1 = β2 = β were a dual-sourcing equilibrium. Then,
(1+γ)α
(β1+γαβ2)
=
2α
2β ≥ 2α−1 > 1. Hence, if both suppliers had equal outside options, then
a dual-sourcing equilibrium exists. Now consider a slight improvement of
supplier 1’s outside option, say. This will slightly reduce the buyer’s gain from
dual-sourcing, or equivalently reduce the Shapley value accruing to supplier 1.
Similarly, a slight deterioration of supplier 2’s outside option, say, will slightly
improve the gain from dual sourcing. Since ∆pii, i = 1, 2, is continuous in βj ,
j = 1, 2, the necessary inequality for the existence of dual-sourcing equilibria
is preserved. ¤
21Of course, if αθ is very high, then production will no longer be profitable, so that a trivial
no-trade equilibrium arises.
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B Data and Auxiliary Regressions
The data comprise roughly six hundred thousand individual contracts be-
tween UK buyers and the (three) manufacturers used in the analysis. Prices
per one thousand bricks are in GBP. Volume is measured in the number of
bricks. Distance is measured in kilometers between the manufacturing plant
and the construction or delivery site. The sourcing variable is the number of
manufacturers that the respective buyer entertains contractual relationships
with during the observation horizon 2001 - 2006. There are dummy variables
indicating whether the bricks of the respective transaction are of the extruded
(as opposed to soft mud) variety, whether they are engineering (as opposed
to facing) bricks, and whether the buyer chose to have the supplier arrange
the delivery or collected the bricks.
The following table provides summary statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Price per 1k 637015 344.802 5093.57 0.0008306 3097000
Volume 637015 5991.746 3910.012 2 264000
sourcing 637015 2.567056 1.325533 1 4
distance 581112 4.089677 17.90908 0 341.3
extruded 637015 .6811441 .4660334 0 1
engineering 637015 .0723782 .2591133 0 1
delivery 637015 0.58792 .4922097 0 1
Table B1: Summary statistics.
Table B2 presents the first stage regression for the IV/2SLS estimation
results presented in Table 3.
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Volume
month 2.639??
(1.331)
year 105.661???
(16.219)
delivery 3620.443???
(8.843)
constant -211541.4 ???
(32446.6)
Table B2: First stage regression results.
? significant at 10 percent level
?? significant at 5 percent level
??? significant at 1 percent level
The four UK brick suppliers have different capacities. Suppliers 1 has 7
plants and supplier 2 has 20 plants. Supplier 3 is the largest supplier, with 23
plants and the largest geographic spread.22 For the three suppliers included
in the analysis, supplier 1 produced an average of 87.3 million bricks per year,
supplier 2 195.2 million and supplier 3 353.7 million bricks per year.
22This information is sourced from the Provisional Findings report of the Competition Commis-
sion.
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